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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAHf l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 870504-CA 
v. : 
DAVID E. BROWN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Theft, a third 
degree felony, after a jury trial in the Third Judicial District 
Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly admitted 
defendant's prior misdemeanor theft convictions under Rule 
609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
2. Whether the trial court properly found that a 
juror's alleged failure to respond to a voir dire question did 
not warrant a new trial? 
3. Whether the trial court properly found that a 
juror's alleged remarks during a recess were not prejudicial pre-
submission deliberations warranting a new trial? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a): 
(a) For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from his or established 
by public record during cross-examination but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14) (1982): 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part 
of the juror with reference to the cause, or 
to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or commons notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17(j) (1982): 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the 
jurors are permitted to separate or are 
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the 
court that it is their duty not to converse 
among themselves or to converse with, or 
suffer themselves to be addressed by any 
other person on any subject of the trial, and 
that it is their duty not to form or express 
an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-24(a) (1982): 
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David E. Brown, was charged with Theft, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-404 
(1978). Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial held on 
September 16, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, 
Judge, presiding. The Court sentenced defendant to serve a term 
of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined 
defendant $5,000.00. The Court suspended the fine and the prison 
term and placed defendant on probation for eighteen months. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 28, 1987, defendant placed a case of cigarettes 
in a shopping basket at a Farmer Jack's grocery store (R. 155, p. 
55-57). He casually pushed the basket up and down the aisles 
until he eventually abandoned the basket and cigarettes and 
walked out of the store (R. 155, p. 57-58). Once outside, 
defendant mounted his ten-speed bike and began riding around the 
store parking lot while gazing through the store window (R. 155, 
p. 58). The store manager, Dale Olson, observed defendant's odd 
activities and informed Gary Young, the store's security officer, 
of defendant's suspicious behavior (R. 155, p. 58). 
Defendant re-entered the store, grabbed the case of 
cigarettes, and began to walk out of the store (R. 155, p. 59). 
Mr. Young stopped defendant as he stepped out of the store (R. 
155, p. 70). The case held 30 cartons of cigarettes valued at 
$323 (R. 155, p. 60). Shortly thereafter, Officer Jo Ellen 
Waymant of the Salt Lake Police Department arrived at the store 
and arrested defendant (R. 155, p. 86). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to 
exclude his prior misdemeanor theft convictions (R. 16-17). The 
trial court ruled that defendant's prior convictions were 
admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant 
(R. 155, p 15). As a result, defendant chose not to testify at 
trial (R. 155, p. 15). 
During the jury deliberations, the court received a 
note from the jury which asked, "Does statements made by jurors 
during recess that disturbed some members render our verdict 
invalid?" (R. 155, p. 92.) The jury was called to the courtroom 
where the judge admonished them to only consider the law and 
evidence presented in the courtroom (R. 155, p. 93). Upon 
further deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty (R. 
155, p. 96). The trial court polled the jury and asked each 
juror individually whether they had considered anything other 
than the evidence presented at the trial or the law given by the 
court (R. 155, p. 96-97). Each juror responded, "no." Id. 
Defendant filed a motion for a New Trial based on two 
grounds (R. 130-31). First, that during voir dire, Juror Hogan 
failed to truthfully respond to general questioning about 
previous retail employment (R. 138-39). Second, that statements 
made by Juror Hogan during a recess constituted pre-submission 
bias against defendant's case (R. 138-39). The trial court 
denied the motion (R. 152-53). Defendant now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly ruled that defendant's prior 
misdemeanor theft convictions were admissible as impeachment 
evidence under Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. The Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that theft is a crime involving 
-dishonesty" for purposes of impeaching the credibility of a 
witness. 
The United States Supreme Court has set forth a two-
prong test to be applied in situations where a juror has 
allegedly failed to disclose information on voir dire. First, a 
defendant must demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly 
a material question on voir dire. Second, he must show that a 
correct response would have provided a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause. In the instant case, defendant failed to 
prove the truth of the hearsay allegations that a juror failed to 
disclose retail experience on voir dire. Second, even if the 
juror had responded that he had retail experience, that fact 
alone was not justification for a challenge for cause. The 
United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected defendant's 
claim that a juror's failure to properly respond on voir dire 
prejudices a defendant's right of peremptory challenge. Further, 
it would be injudicious for this Court to adopt a presumptive 
error rule under the State Constitution for alleged and unproven 
juror non-disclosure on voir dire. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's Motion for New Trial based upon its finding that the 
alleged juror pre-submission statements were ambiguous and open 
to multiple interpretation, that any error was cured by the 
court's admonition and polling of the jury, and that any error 
was harmless in light of the strong evidence of guilt. Further, 
under State constitutional analysis, the determination whether a 
juror had pre-judged a defendant's guilt should be the 
prerogative of the trial court, subject to review for abuse of 
discretion. Finally, the trial court's failure to admonish the 
jury not to converse during recesses was harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR THEFT CONVICTIONS WERE 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 609(a)(2). 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding 
that defendant's prior misdemeanor theft convictions were 
admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by 
the admission of the impeachment evidence in that he was 
effectively denied his right to testify on his own behalf. 
Rule 609(a) allows evidence of other crimes to be 
admitted for impeachment purposes under the following 
circumstances: 
Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. (a)General rule: For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 609(a). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1984) unequivocally ruled that theft is a crime of 
dishonesty for purposes of impeachment evidence. Admittedly, 
Cintron was based upon former Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, but was decided after the adoption of the new Rules of 
Evidence in 1983. Cintron, 690 P.2d at 34. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court's definition of crimes involving "dishonesty" as 
including theft has not been overruled and is controlling. 
In the instant case, the trial court ruled that 
defendant's prior misdemeanor theft convictions were admissible 
as impeachment evidence since they constituted crimes of 
"dishonesty" as contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence (R. 155, p. 15). The trial court further stated that 
defendant's prior theft convictions directly reflect on the 
question of defendant's credibility. Id. Therefore, the trial 
court's ruling of admissibility was consistent with controlling 
Utah case law and evidentiary rules. 
In his brief, defendant relies on State v. Banner, 717 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 
1987) to argue that the defendant's misdemeanor theft convictions 
should have been ruled inadmissible under 609(a). Neither Banner 
nor Gentry are applicable since they were decided under sub-
paragraph (1) of Rule 609(a) which requires a balancing test for 
the admission of general felony convictions. In both Banner and 
Gentry, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not 
properly weigh the probative value of the impeachment evidence 
against its prejudicial effect. The court did not address the 
issue of whether those convictions would have been admissible 
under subsection (2) of Rule 609(a). 
Other courts have ruled that theft type crimes are 
admissible as crimes of "dishonesty" under Rule 609(a)(2), In 
United States v. Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd., 
547 F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1977), the district court judge ruled 
that a prior conviction for breaking and entering, and armed 
robbery were crimes of dishonesty. The court thus admitted the 
convictions for the limited purpose of impeachment. See also, 
United States v. Ackridqe, 370 F.Supp. 214, 218 (E.D.Pa. 1973) 
aff'd., 500 F.2d 1400 (1974); United States v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257 
(3rd Cir. 1972); United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d 1267, 1269, 
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert, denied 404 U.S. 957 (1971). 
Defendant also relies on United States v. Smith, 551 
F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) for his assertion that theft is not a 
crime involving dishonesty. However, Smith involved an attempted 
robbery conviction which was admitted by the trial court without 
a consideration of Rule 609. Id. at 357. The appellate court 
found that attempted robbery is a crime of violence, not 
dishonesty, and remanded the case back to the trial court for a 
determination whether the probative value of admitting the 
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Id. 
Defendant further cites United States v. Millings, 535 
F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976) in which the Smith court ruled that 
neither possession of a pistol without a license nor possession 
of narcotics possess elements of dishonesty. Because the 
offenses in Millings are not theft related, Millings is 
unsupportive of defendant's claim. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT A JUROR'S 
ALLEGED FAILURE TO RESPOND ON VOIR DIRE DID 
NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
A. Defendant's Fair-Trial Rights Under The 
United States Constitution Were Not 
Violated By A Juror's Alleged Failure To 
Respond To A Voir Dire Question. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in 
refusing to grant him a new trial where a juror allegedly failed 
to respond affirmatively to a question during voir dire. 
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced because he was unable to 
challenge the juror for cause, use a peremptory challenge, or 
further question the juror. 
The United States Supreme Court in McDonough Power 
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood et al., 464 U.S. 548 (1984) set 
forth the test to be applied in situations where a juror has 
allegedly failed to disclose information on voir dire. The 
McDonough test is as follows: 
We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a 
situation, a party must first demonstrate 
that a juror failed to answer honestly a 
material question on voir dire, and then 
further show that a correct response would 
have provided a valid basis for a challenge 
for cause. . . . 
464 U.S. at 556. In the present case, defendant fails to meet 
either prong of the two-prong test. 
In ruling on defendant's Motion for New Trial, the 
trial court found that the alleged statements of Juror Hogan 
contained in the affidavits were ambiguous and did not reflect 
bias or prejudice (R. 156, p. 30-31). Further, defendant failed 
to establish at the motion hearing that Juror Hogan actually 
possessed retail experience and thus failed to respond 
affirmatively to voir dire questioning. Regarding hearsay 
allegations of juror misconduct, the Colorado Court of Appeals 
has held that: 
a defendant must establish the truth of the 
allegations on which he basis his motion for 
new trial and must produce evidence of the 
alleged jury misconduct. . . Failure to 
establish the truth of hearsay allegations 
contained in an affidavit will warrant denial 
of a motion for new trial based on alleged 
juror misconduct. . . . 
People v. Rodgers, 706 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Colo. App. 1985) 
(citations omitted). Because defendant failed to prove the 
hearsay allegations contained in the affidavits, the first prong 
of the McDonough test was not established. 
Defendant further fails to establish the second-prong 
of the McDonough test which is that a correct response by the 
juror would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 
cause. During voir dire, six jurors responded that they had 
worked in a retail store and were further asked whether their 
experience would affect their impartiality if they were selected 
as a juror. Each answered that their retail experience would not 
prevent them from being fair and impartial and, as a result, none 
of them were questioned or challenged for cause by defendant (R. 
155, p. 36-38). Notably, defendant did not use a peremptory 
challenge against any of the retail experienced jurors (R. 114-
15). 
Clearly, under the facts of the present case, the 
possession of retail experience by a juror was insufficient by 
itself to establish grounds for a successful challenge for cause. 
Therefore, under the McDonough test, defendant was not prejudiced 
by Juror Hogan's alleged failure to disclose any retail 
experience. 
In support of his argument, defendant relies on People 
v. Diaz, 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984) to assert that the McDonough test has been expanded. In 
Diaz, the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District 
held that a juror's failure to respond truthfully on voir dire 
deprives a defendant of his right to challenge for cause or to 
exercise a peremptory challenge. Diaz, 152 Cal.App.3d at 932-33. 
Defendant urges that Diaz extends the McDonough test to include 
situations where a truthful juror response would be grounds for a 
peremptory challenge. However, the United States Supreme Court 
in McDonough clearly rejected such a broad standard. In 
McDonough, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 
juror's failure to respond affirmatively on voir dire prejudiced 
defendant's right of peremptory challenge. Ld. at 551-52. The 
United States Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's ruling 
and articulated the McDonough standard which requires a denial of 
a challenge for cause. Ld. at 556. 
Other courts in California have rejected the ruling in 
Diaz. People v. Kelly, 185 Cal.App.3d 118, 229 Cal.Rptr. 584 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Jackson, 168 Cal.App.3d 700, 214 
Cal.Rptr. 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). In Jackson, the California 
Court of Appeals for the Second District agreed with the holding 
in McDonough that: 
M
. . . [a] trial represents an important 
investment of private and social resources, 
and it ill serves the important end of 
finality to wipe the slate clean simply to 
recreate the peremptory challenge process 
because counsel lacked an item of information 
which objectively he should have obtained 
from a juror on voir dire examination." • . . 
This court has long held that '"[a litigant] 
is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect 
one/' for there are no perfect trials.' . . . 
People v. Jackson, 214 Cal.Rptr. at 349, quoting McDonough, 464 
U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Likewise, the Kelly court 
agreed with the dissent in Diaz that the right to exercise a 
peremptory challenge does not support a presumption of prejudice. 
People v. Kelly, 229 Cal.Rptr. at 584. 
Defendant also relies on United States v. Bynum, 634 
F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1980) and People v. Borrelli, 624 P.2d 900 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1980) which were decided prior to McDonough. 
Unlike the present case, both Bynum and Borrelli involved 
intentional concealment of bias by a juror. In the present case, 
there was no evidence presented in the lower court that Juror 
Hogan intentionally concealed information nor that prejudice 
resulted. In fact, the trial record establishes that Juror Hogan 
was not prejudiced against defendant as evidenced by his response 
during the polling of the jury: 
THE COURT: Mr. David Hogan, was your verdict 
in this case influenced by anything other 
than the evidence presented in this courtroom 
and the law given you by the Court? 
JUROR NO. 8: No, sir. 
(R. 155, p. 97). Juror Hogan's answer assured the court that he 
had only considered the evidence at trial and the law given by 
the court and that he found defendant guilty based only on the 
law and the evidence. 
B. Defendant's Fair-Trial Rights Under The 
Utah Constitution Were Not Violated By A 
Juror's Alleged Failure To Respond To A 
Voir Dire Question. 
While admitting that there is no Utah case law 
precedent on the issue, defendant argues that the Utah 
constitution requires a more stringent test than the federal 
constitution when jury misconduct is involved. In support of his 
argument, defendant relies on State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 
1985) and State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987) in which 
the court's holdings were limited to situations involving juror 
contact with witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel. Id. 
Defendant analogizes that as in Pike and Erickson, this Court 
should hold that a juror's alleged and unproven failure to 
respond to a voir dire question should be presumed error. 
Defendant's argument should be rejected. 
The United States Supreme Court in McDonough expressed 
its opinion in this regard when it said " [w]e have come a long 
way from the time when all trial error was presumed prejudicial 
and reviewing courts were considered "'citadels of 
technicality.'"" McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553, quoting Kotteakos 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) quoting Kanaugh, 
Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of 
Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1925). "To invalidate the 
result of a 3-week trial because of a juror's mistaken, though 
honest, response to a question, is to insist on something closer 
to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give." 
464 U.S. at 555. 
As the California court noted in People v. Jackson, 
supra; 
It is with good reason that the law places 
severe limitations on the ability to impeach 
a jury's verdict. To hold otherwise would be 
to declare "open season" on jury verdicts not 
to a party's liking. A green light would be 
given for every unsuccessful litigant to root 
out after-the-fact evidence of any 
"subconscious bias." . . . 
People v. Jackson, 214 Cal.Rptr. at 348. 
For the same reasons, it would be injudicious for this 
court to adopt a presumptive error rule for alleged and unproven 
juror non-disclosure on voir dire. To allow such would permit an 
unsuccessful criminal defendant to presumptively invalidate an 
otherwise valid verdict by merely alleging, but not proving, 
juror bias. Thus, the burden in attacking a verdict would no 
longer be placed on the party seeking to upset the judgment, but 
rather, the burden would be placed on the party seeking to 
maintain it. As a result, the harmless error rule which requires 
a showing of prejudice in order to justify a reversal would be 
vitiated. Therefore, respondent strongly urges this Court to 
interpret Utah constitutional law consistent with the Supreme 
Court's ruling in McDonough. 
Defendant further relies on Rule 18 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure which sets forth the grounds upon which a 
juror may be challenged for cause. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
18(e)(14) (1982). Defendant then speculates that had juror Hogan 
responded affirmatively to the voir dire question, "he very well 
may have fit within this subsection allowing for dismissal" (Br. 
of App. at p. 16). As argued above, mere speculation of juror 
bias should not be grounds upon which to presume prejudice. In 
the absence of a showing of undisclosed juror bias which would, 
if disclosed, have been grounds to challenge for cause, the trial 
court's denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial was proper. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN RULING THAT A JUROR'S ALLEGED COMMENTS 
DURING A RECESS DID NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
A. Defendant's Fair-Trial Rights Under The 
United States Constitution Were Not Violated 
By A Juror's Alleged Comments During A 
Recess. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying 
his Motion for New Trial which alleged that Juror Hogan made 
prejudicial statements during a recess which constituted pre-
submission deliberations. He concludes that any pre-submission 
jury deliberations violates a defendant's constitutional 
guarantee to an impartial jury. 
A motion for new trial is governed by Rule 24(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: 
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-24(a) (1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that Mthe 
decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion 
with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 
(Utah 1985); State v. Bundy, 589 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1978), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 926 (1979); State v. Swain, 541 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah 1975). 
The Court further explained that a trial court will not be considered 
to have abused its discretion unless it is shown that there is a grave 
suspicion of a miscarriage of justice. State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 438 
(Utah 1973). In other words, M[i]f there be evidence before the court 
upon which reasonable men might differ as to whether or not the 
defendant is guilty, the trial court may deny a motion for a new 
trial. " J[d. at 440. 
In the present case, a woman juror allegedly commented 
during a pre-deliberation recess that "the defense attorney did 
not appear worried" (R. 138). In response, Juror Hogan stated, 
"Well, that guy doesn't matter." 1(1. He further referred to 
defendant as "that black man." Id. 
During jury deliberations, the jury caused a note to be 
sent to the trial court (R. 155, p. 92). The jury returned to 
the courtroom and the following dialogue took place: 
THE COURT: The Court has received a note 
from the jury as follows: "Does statements 
made by jurors during recess that disturbed 
some members render our verdict invalid?" 
The question sent out of the jury room has 
been shown to both counsel. The Court asked 
each individual juror during the jury 
selection process if you would listen to the 
law that was given to you by the Court, apply 
that law to the facts that were produced in 
court, evidence produced in court, and render 
a decision based on the law given and the 
facts and evidence presented in court. Each 
juror indicated, equivocally, they would. 
Your responsibility in this case is to 
disregard anything that you think has been 
said that may have some bearing on the 
outcome of the case. Disregard any 
conjecture or speculation that could possibly 
have come into consideration in the jury 
room. You decide the case solely on the law 
given to you by the Court and on the evidence 
that was produced in the courtroom. Anything 
further? 
JUROR NO. 6: Is that satisfactory to 
everyone? 
(Affirmative response.) 
JUROR NO. 6: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You are welcome. 
(R. 155, pp. 92-93). 
The jury resumed deliberations and subsequently 
returned a verdict of guilty (R. 155, p. 96). The trial judge 
then polled each member of the jury whether their verdict was 
influenced by anything other than the evidence presented in the 
courtroom and the law given by the court (R. 155, pp. 96-97). 
Each member of the jury, including Juror Hogan, responded that 
they were not influenced by anything other than the law and the 
evidence. Id. 
At the hearing on defendant's Motion for New Trial, 
defendant introduced an affidavit of Juror Alan Blain which 
alleged that Juror Hogan's statements were such that he appeared 
to have pre-determined defendant's guilt (R. 138-39). 
Defendant's trial counsel also submitted her affidavit setting 
forth her conversations with the jury members (R. 132-33). 
Pursuant to Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial 
court, on the State's motion, struck all statements and 
affidavits which inquired into the validity of the jury's verdict 
without a claim of extraneous influence (R. 22). 
In ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court found 
as follows: 
THE COURT; The Court makes the following 
findings. The statements made by the juror, 
Mr. Hogan, all three statements are ambiguous 
and subject to multiple interpretation. None 
of the statements reflect a direct expression 
of bias or prejudice against the defendant or 
a predetermination of the defendant's 
innocence or guilt by the juror making the 
statement. 
Secondly, the Court finds that 
the statements made by the juror were perhaps 
inappropriate and perhaps were of some degree 
of error, but, in the totality of the case, 
the statements were harmless. 
The Court further finds that once the 
concern by the jurors, after deliberations 
had commenced, that there was some concern 
about events that had occurred out of the 
jury room, the court assembled the jury. The 
jurors were questioned. The jurors were 
instructed that they were to follow the law, 
as set forth by the Court in its 
instructions, to apply the law to the facts 
that were presented in court, and that a 
proper and thorough admonition was given to 
the jurors prior to the time that a guilty 
verdict was returned against the defendant, 
and that any error that may have occurred 
prior to that time was corrected by the 
Court's inquiry and admonition. 
The Court further finds that the outcome 
of this case would not have been any 
different whether the juror had made the 
prior expressions or not. The case, in the 
Court's opinion, was a very strong case for 
the State, regarding the defendant's guilt, 
and that any error that occurred was harmless 
error in the total scheme of the case. 
The Court, therefore, denies the motion 
for a new trial on those specific findings. 
(R. 155, pp. 30-31) . 
Thus, the trial court denied defendant's motion for 
three reasons: (1) that Juror Hogan's statements were ambiguous, 
open to multiple interpretations, and did not reflect bias or a 
pre-determination of guilt; (2) that any error was cured by the 
trial court's admonition to the jury and polling of the jury's 
verdict, and; (3) that any error was harmless in light of the 
strong evidence of defendant's guilt. The trial court's findings 
being soundly based and clearly set forth, no abuse of discretion 
exists. 
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a 
trial court's denial of a Motion for New Trial. In State v. 
Moon, 688 P.2d 4 94 (Utah 1984), a bystander overheard one juror 
say to another, "Well, we only have to hear one more confession 
and then we are through." Icl. at 495. The Court found that the 
juror's statement "can be construed in a number of ways that do 
not necessarily support defendant's conclusion that the juror had 
prejudged defendant's guilt before all the evidence was 
presented." ^d. Under such circumstances, the Court stated that 
it is the prerogative of the trial court to determine whether a 
hearsay statement, subject to multiple interpretations, is 
prejudicial, and, if so, if it is to the point of reversibility. 
1^. at 495-96. 
Likewise, in the instant case, great deference should 
be afforded the trial court's finding that the hearsay statements 
were ambiguous, subject to multiple interpretations and did not 
constitute reversible prejudice. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's new trial motion. 
B. Defendant's Fair-Trial Rights Under The Utah 
Constitution Were Not Violated By A Juror's Alleged 
Comments During A Recess. 
Defendant argues that on questions of juror 
impartiality, Utah constitutional protections surpass federal 
protections. He urges this Court to adopt a standard of presumed 
prejudice in circumstances where pre-submission deliberations 
are suspected. In support of his argument, defendant again 
relies on State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) in which the 
Utah Supreme Court found that juror contact with witnesses, 
attorneys, or court personnel is presumed prejudicial. 
As discussed in Point II above, it would be ill-advised 
for this Court to adopt a presumptive error rule for alleged and 
unproven pre-submission jury deliberations. In fact, the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Moon, 688 P.2d 494 (Utah 1984), under 
similar circumstances, found that it is the trial court's 
prerogative to determine whether a juror had pre-judged a 
defendant's guilt before all the evidence was presented. Ld. at 
495. In light of the trial court's finding in the present case, 
as in Moon, that the evidence did not support defendant's claim 
of pre-submission deliberations, this Court should defer to the 
trial court's advantaged position. 
Defendant further claims that Rule 17(j) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure extends his State constitutional 
protections in circumstances where pre-submission deliberations 
are suspected. Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-17(j) (1982). Rule 17 
reads as follows: 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the 
jurors are permitted to separate or are 
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the 
court that it is their duty not to converse 
among themselves or to converse with, or 
suffer themselves to be addressed by any 
other person on any subject of the trial, and 
that it is their duty not to form or express 
an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
Id, Defendant claims that because the trial court failed to 
admonish the jurors during a brief recess and at lunch, 
prejudicial error must be presumed. Defendant's claim is wholly 
without merit. 
First, defendant failed to contemporaneously raise the 
issue in the trial court below and is thus precluded from raising 
the issue for the first time on appeal. See State v. McCardell, 
652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) (applying contemporaneous objection rule 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1)). Second, the recess and lunch break 
were respectively prior to the taking of evidence and after the 
evidence had been presented (R. 155, pp. 54, 87). Third, the 
juror statements alleged to be deliberative were ambiguous and 
insufficient to support defendant's claim of prejudice (R. 138; 
R. 155, pp. 30-31). 
Finally, the trial court's failure to admonish the jury 
at the recess and lunch break should be considered harmless error 
in the absence of a showing of prejudice. See Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-35-30(a) (1982); Utah R. Evid. 103; State v. Tucker, 709 
P.2d 313 (Utah 1985) (the court will not reverse a conviction 
unless the error is something substantial and prejudicial in the 
sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence 
there would have been a different result). In the present case, 
the trial court admonished the jury to consider only the law and 
evidence given in the courtroom (R. 155, p. 92-93). When polled, 
each member of the jury acknowledged that they had considered 
only the law and evidence (R. 155, pp. 96-97). The jury's 
conscientious behavior in notifying the court of disturbing juror 
statements indicates that the jury wanted to assure the integrity 
and objectivity of their verdict• Lastly, the trial court found 
that on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the strongest case 
establishing guilt, defendant's trial rated a 10 (R. 156, pp. 17-
18). In light of the above circumstances, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that defendant would have been acquitted had the trial 
court admonished the jurors not to converse among themselves 
during any recess. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, respondent 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence. 
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